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Islam's Enduring Feud

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The struggle for primacy in modern Islam, conducted within and among Muslim states, has not generally taken the form of a sectarian contest. Battle lines have not been drawn precisely along the traditional lines of Islamic sectarian strife. Yet beneath the internal debate on the true meaning of Islam, there remains a substratum of distrust rooted in ancient prejudice. The most virulent form of this distrust afflicts the mutual perceptions of Sunnis and Shi'is. On both sides of the divide, none dare speak the name of this bigotry. For most Muslims, it is considered bad form to dwell openly upon the differences between Sunni and Shi'i Islam, and the mere enumeration of these differences is often denounced as part of an imperialist plot to foment division. This reflects the influence of ecumenism upon the intellectual climate of contemporary Islam, a climate now inhospitable to overt sectarian polemics.

Yet the principal division in contemporary Islam closely paralleled the principal division of medieval Islam. Where the Mesopotamian lowlands met the Zagros mountains, the awakening of Islam had already produced a devastating war between Muslim Iranians and Muslim Iraqis, along the same frontier of Islamic history's great internecine struggle between Safavids and Ottomans. In 1987, it was the turn of Mecca to witness the reenactment of Islamic history. But unlike the annual reenactment of the drama of Karbala, in which Shi'is inflict wounds upon themselves to evoke the passion of a battle lost over one thousand years ago, the drama at Mecca was all too real. What had been a polemical war of words between Saudi and Iranian Islam took on the virulent character of a blood feud between Sunni and Shi'i Islam. The events of 1987 demonstrated the tenacious hold of sectarian hatred upon the imagination of contemporary Islam.

ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN KUWAIT

The plunge into violence was preceded by a ritual attempt to find Islam's common political ground. The Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), bound by its charter to convene an Islamic summit conference every three years, again faced the difficult prospect of a summit. ICO diplomacy was a casualty of the war between two member states, Iran and Iraq, a conflict which had defied all ICO attempts at mediation. Still, most of the ICO member states did see some benefit in periodic Islamic conferences, which provided regular opportunities for these states to attempt to influence one another, declare their policy preferences, and register expressions of Muslim solidarity. Islamic summits were especially important, since few diplomatic forums provided the opportunity to bring together so many heads of states in conflict. The host this time was Kuwait, for a gathering that met from 26–29 January.[1] (For the ICO's difficulties since the outbreak of the Gulf War, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 283–84, 298–301;

1982–83, pp. 235–37; 1983–84, pp. 158–65; 1984–85, pp. 146–48; 1986, pp. 127–30. This essay deals with the Kuwait summit's significance for the Muslim world and the ICO itself; for the summit's role in inter-Arab affairs, see essay on inter-Arab relations.)

In many respects, the summit replayed scenes from the two previous Islamic summits, held in Ta'if in January 1981 and Casablanca in January 1984. Once again, the organizers made obligatory but fruitless attempts to secure Iranian participation. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran had adopted an indifferent attitude toward the ICO, first because of the organization's close dependence upon Saudi Arabia, and later because of the ICO's stand in favor of an immediate cease-fire in the Gulf War and the withdrawal of both sides to international borders. As a result, Islamic Iran had never attended an Islamic summit. Still, ICO Secretary-General Sharifuddin Pirzada (himself a Pakistani) felt obligated to try to secure Iran's participation. The geographic proximity of the summit to the war front added to the urgency of this mission. As Jordan's King Husayn later noted during the summit: "Isn't it a terrible irony that we sit here in this comfortable air-conditioned hall while missiles and shells are thundering within earshot of us — missiles and shells we know are fired by Muslims against other Muslims?"[2]

In November 1986, the ICO convened its "Islamic Good Offices Committee" under Gambian President Dawda Jawara, to consider a peace initiative as part of the summit preparations.[3] Pirzada then spent the last days of December 1986 in Iran, running from Iranian leader to Iranian leader — including Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati, Prime Minister Husayn Musavi, *Majlis* Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and President 'Ali Khameneh'i. These had apparently decided against attending the summit, since any Iranian delegation would face intense pressure from Muslim states anxious to see the war ended in accordance with past ICO resolutions. But Iranian leaders justified their decision by claiming that Kuwait did not constitute a sufficiently neutral site for the conference. Velayati told Pirzada: "If you think Kuwait can compensate for its past mistakes and adopt a neutral stance, we will take into consideration the level of Iran's participation at the conference, if any."[4] Kuwait did have an interest in the success of the conference, but could not be expected to alter a fundamental policy to win Iran's possible participation in the summit.

Once Iran made known its refusal, its Shi'i supporters in Beirut began to issue all kinds of threats against the conference. A Saudi businessman was kidnapped and held in Beirut for 56 days, in a move reportedly connected with the summit.[5] A previously unknown group claimed credit for bombings at an oil complex in southern Kuwait on the eve of the summit, as well as a bombing in the city. The Kuwaiti authorities later arrested 11 people, apparently Kuwaiti Shi'is of Iranian origin, in connection with the oil-field attack.[6] Mindful of the possibility of violence, Kuwait took exceptional security measures as the summit approached.

Pirzada had greater success wherever he combined forces with the summit host, and especially with Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah and other personal envoys from the emir of Kuwait. The Kuwaitis used all of their considerable influence to assure a maximum turnout. In the end, 27 of the ICO's 46 member states were represented by heads of state, the highest proportion since the first Islamic summit in 1969. Eight member states were represented by their vice presidents or prime ministers; eight others were represented by foreign ministers or

presidents of national assemblies. The PLO, a full member of the ICO, was represented by its chairman, Yasir 'Arafat. The only two absent member states were Afghanistan, suspended from the ICO since 1980, and Iran.[7]

Despite Iran's absence, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad did elect to attend the conference. By now, this had become a familiar Syrian-Iranian maneuver. To keep the Gulf War off the agenda, Iran would absent itself from ICO gatherings, but Syria would attend in order to channel all discussion away from the Gulf and toward the question of Palestine's liberation. Despite the ample precedent for this method, rumors persisted that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had bought Syrian participation.[8]

The summit preparations, and the summit itself, subsequently revolved around inter-Arab maneuvering, especially between Egypt and Syria. (For more details on this dimension of the summit, see essay on inter-Arab relations and chapter on Egypt.) Most of the ICO's diplomacy over the previous three years had revolved around this same axis. The previous summit at Casablanca, in January 1984, had restored Egypt to the ICO after a five-year suspension which followed the Camp David accords — a restoration vigorously opposed by Syria, but reflecting the will of the majority of the ICO's member states. Since that summit, Egypt had participated in all the conferences of ICO foreign ministers. Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's participation in the Kuwait summit signaled the final stage in the readmission of Egypt. The fact that Asad publicly shook Mubarak's hand (and briefly met with Mubarak privately) did not signify a full reconciliation,[9] but it did demonstrate Syria's reluctant resignation to the fact of Egypt's restoration to the ICO.[10]

This did not mean that Mubarak and Asad did not skirmish at Kuwait. Indeed, the little excitement the conference did generate grew from their attempts to outmaneuver each other (and from Syrian-Egyptian clashes in the meeting of foreign ministers that immediately preceded the summit). Asad continued to demand that Egypt revoke the Camp David accords, and maintained that Egypt stood in violation of past ICO resolutions.[11] Mubarak came to Kuwait with alleged proof that Syria, despite its claim to purity, maintained numerous open channels to Israel.[12] These charges found their way into the deliberations, but both sides exercised a certain measure of restraint in making them.

On the issue of Palestine, the summit did little more than reiterate past resolutions. Here, however, Egyptian diplomacy scored a number of points, winning a resolution in favor of an international conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was balanced, for Syria's sake, by the reiteration of a previous resolution condemning all relations with Israel — even though Egypt's own presence demonstrated that such relations were no bar to ICO membership. The position of the ICO on the issue of Palestine constituted a confusing amalgam of contradictory resolutions that reflected the profound disagreement among member states. It was clear from this confusion that, in dealing with Palestine, the ICO had given up the quest for consensus. Instead, ICO conferences endorsed virtually every conceivable option, including *jihad*, the Fez plan, and a full-blown peace conference. At Kuwait, too, both Asad and Mubarak were rewarded with resolutions they could take home and present as triumphs of their own diplomatic tact.

For 'Arafat, who already possessed an ample supply of ICO resolutions, it generally sufficed that the ICO recognized him as a head of state. By now he knew the ways of the ICO, and had settled into the comfortable routine of elder statesman. He did

receive a resolution condemning Amal's siege of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (see chapter on Lebanon), a resolution that carried an implicit criticism of Syria. The summit expressed its "strong condemnation of the continuation of the siege imposed by Amal militias, which are backed by Syria, on Palestinian camps."[13] 'Arafat also met with King Husayn for the first time in almost a year, prompting inevitable speculation about renewed cooperation between the two rivals (see essay on the PLO and chapter on Jordan).

As for the Gulf War, no progress could be made in the absence of Iran, and the summit simply reiterated past resolutions. The summit "expressed satisfaction with Iraq's standpoint in accepting the ICO resolutions," and called on Iran to "announce its acceptance of these resolutions and agree to end the war and settle the conflict by peaceful means."[14] But the Good Offices Committee remained moribund, and the ICO undertook no new initiatives following the summit. Later in the year, 'Arafat called for an emergency Islamic summit to mediate an end to the war. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia viewed the proposal favorably.[15] But nothing came of this initiative. The summit also approved the draft charter of the ICO's Islamic Court of Justice, an idea inspired by the Gulf War. Kuwait's foreign minister declared that the court would be "fully established" by the sixth summit.[16]

On the matter of Afghanistan, the summit slightly moderated the ICO's stance, in recognition of the declared Soviet intention to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet sent a cable of greetings and support to the summit, declaring that the USSR "does not intend to keep for long in Afghanistan the troops it sent to that country."[17] Alongside the ICO's demand for an "immediate withdrawal" — the language of past ICO resolutions — the summit welcomed the intensive UN efforts then under way to resolve the conflict.[18] Afghan resistance leaders were reassured of the ICO's moral support, but they still attended the conference only as guests, not as members or even as observers. In short, the issue of Afghanistan did not figure near the head of the ICO's agenda. The Soviets expressed satisfaction with the positive reception given to their message to the summit,[19] and *Pravda*'s editorial on the summit viewed it favorably, noting that the Afghan question "was not raised like the Western countries hoped it would be."[20] In February, Pirzada visited Moscow, his second visit in as many years, confirming the continuation of an earlier trend toward dialogue with the Soviet Union.[21] After Pirzada's visit, the emir of Kuwait sent a cable to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on behalf of the ICO, expressing appreciation for the Soviet intention to withdraw forces from Afghanistan "as soon as a political solution is found."[22]

The Kuwait meeting therefore loomed as the most inconsequential Islamic summit held to date. For Mubarak, of course, it represented one more step in Egypt's restoration to Arab-Islamic legitimacy, a restoration achieved on his own terms. But a monumental effort had been required to bring about this incremental improvement in Egypt's standing. In a way, the preoccupation with Egypt, which had also characterized the previous summit, represented another step in the transformation of the ICO. Some commentators astutely observed that the Kuwait conference was not so much an Islamic summit as an Arab summit attended by "observers" from non-Arab Islamic states.[23] The ICO no longer served its original purpose of lining up non-Arab Muslim support for an Arab consensus on Palestine. It now functioned as an alternative forum for the thrashing out of Arab differences.

Another noteworthy feature of ICO summitry as demonstrated in Kuwait was the incredible expenditure on the part of the host state. The conference complex built by Kuwait for the summit cost $400m. Erected 10 km. from the city, this 500,000-sq. m. palace included luxurious apartments, an exclusive shopping mall, a 100,000-book library, a clinic and an emergency hospital staffed by 340 doctors, all surrounded by palm trees from Basra and dwarf chrysanthemums from the US. No doubt the complex would be used for other functions in the future, and its cost hardly represented expenditure on the summit alone. Yet the fact remained that states were willing to spend vast sums on conference halls while the ICO itself struggled financially between summit conferences. (On the ICO's financial difficulties, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 130–31.) Kuwait's extravagance had been exceeded only by that of Saudi Arabia, which had spent $1 bn. on facilities for the Ta'if Islamic summit six years earlier. It could be argued that one of the ICO's most tangible achievements in the 1980s was to accelerate the construction of luxurious conference facilities — temples of talk — in a few rich Muslim states.

The Kuwait summit, by its reiteration of past summit resolutions, emphasized the impasse of Muslim solidarity and Islam's failure to heal its self-inflicted wounds. It would be remembered as the sumptuous summit convened while the shells fell. As Kuwait's foreign minister declared on the eve of the summit, "I wonder with all honesty and sincerity how our ranks will unite, how our efforts will coalesce, and how the principles of our organization will be achieved as long as that war [between Iran and Iraq] undermines the body of our Islamic world."[24] Jordan's Husayn posed the same question: "How meaningful is Islamic solidarity if Muslims continue to slaughter each other? What value will economic development have if we allow our Muslim brethren to continue to fight one another? And what value will the ICO have if it fails to put an end to this communal strife and to unify the ranks and rechannel the energies of the Muslims to face the common enemies of Islam?"[25] These painful questions received no clear answer at Kuwait.

The ICO's other activities were restricted not so much by politics as by the lack of money. Member states continued to evade their proportional commitments to financing the organization, and the ICO's Secretariat remained dependent on Saudi funding: Pirzada put the Saudi share at 20% of the ICO's general budget.[26] Saudi Arabia reportedly made it clear to the ICO Secretariat that it was no longer prepared to serve as paymaster, and that every member state had to shoulder its fair share of the costs.[27] But the pinch was felt more in the subsidiary organs of the ICO. The ICO's International Islamic News Agency continued its slide into debt (see *MECS* 1986, p. 131). The agency owed SR9m., mostly to Italian firms, and an additional SR2m. to Saudi Arabia for telecommunications services.[28] During the year, Pirzada made a special appeal to member states to bail out the troubled agency.[29] The Islamic Solidarity Fund (ISF), established in 1974, had cut back its operations because of insufficient funds. Since its creation, the ISF had spent $112m. on universities, clinics, mosques, and disaster relief. But according to the chairman of the ISF's Permanent Council, financial difficulties faced by the ISF's principal contributors (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Libya) had caused a precipitous drop in the ISF's income. It now launched a new campaign to raise funds from states that had not been major contributors in the past.[30] The financial health of other subsidiary organizations and projects remained uncertain.

Ultimately, the politics of Muslim solidarity represented a rebellion against modern history, and against the power of the West. The ICO had set for itself a monumental task. In the 18 years since the first Islamic summit at Rabat, had the Muslim world achieved greater unity, diminished its dependence on the West, resolved more of its own conflicts peacefully, or made the return of Jerusalem more likely? It was difficult to argue that it had, impossible to prove that it had not. But few doubted that the confident 1970s had been kinder to the organization than the strife-torn 1980s. The mission of the ICO was to survive into the 1990s, into the era of Muslim reconciliation that would hopefully follow a settlement of the Gulf conflict. And so the ICO joined the ranks of those many other international organizations devoted first and foremost to their own survival.

THE MARCH OF SUNNI ISLAM

As in the past, the self-appointed guardians of Sunni Islam continued to wage a subtle but systematic campaign against the revolutionary doctrines and ideas disseminated by Iran. This campaign rarely took the form of overt sectarian polemics, but it rested upon the unspoken conviction that Shi'ism represented a deviation from true Islam. Those same Sunnis who championed the ideal of Muslim political unity seemed determined to do everything to exclude adherents of Shi'ism from the consensus of Islam, attesting to the tenacity of old prejudices.

This Sunni attempt to excommunicate revolutionary Shi'is from the community of Islam took several organized forms during the first half of the year. The Mecca-based Muslim World League (MWL; *Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami*) stood at the center of the anti-Shi'i agitation, which was a by-product of the MWL's larger effort to establish Saudi Islam as definitive orthodoxy. (On the MWL, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 295–97; 1982–83, pp. 246–47; 1983–84, pp. 165–66; 1984–85, p. 149; 1986, pp. 132–33.)[31] As in the past, the MWL sought to achieve its aims through the sponsorship of Islamic associations, mosques, and conferences around the world. This campaign acquired a new urgency following the Mecca incident. (On the activities of the MWL in response to the incident, see below.)

The MWL celebrated its 25th anniversary in 1987, and this provided an opportunity to take stock of its achievements. This it tended to do in quantitative terms; nonetheless some of the figures did provide insight into the scope of the MWL's activities. The MWL's governing Constituent Council had met 27 times since the MWL's establishment in 1962. The MWL's Supreme World Council of Mosques annually dispensed SR25m. provided by the Saudi Government for mosques worldwide. The MWL employed 936 Muslim missionaries throughout the world: 336 served in Africa; 295 in Indonesia; 206 in the rest of Asia and the Pacific; and 99 in Europe and the Americas. Salaries and other expenses for these missionaries cost the MWL some SR15m. a year. The MWL trained imams, *khatibs*, and missionaries in two-year courses in its own training center in Mecca, providing students with board, books, flight tickets, and a monthly stipend of SR800. Each year, about 1,000 Muslims from around the world attended the pilgrimage as guests of the MWL. The MWL had also organized 15 international Islamic "seminars" during pilgrimage seasons. A special department for projects and subsidies annually dispensed SR6m. to Muslim associations and organizations. The MWL was about to occupy new premises, a

28,000-sq. m. office building constructed with a grant from the Saudi Ministry of Finance and National Economy.[32] The MWL was established long before the Iranian Revolution, but its rapid expansion reflected the Saudi preoccupation with deflecting Iran's claim to speak for true Islam.

The MWL did not stand alone. Other regimes that felt similarly threatened by Iran's revolutionary interpretation of Islam sponsored similar activities, albeit on a smaller scale. Thus, Egypt sought to demonstrate the supposed primacy of its religious establishment and the theological university of al-Azhar in Cairo. The central figures in this effort remained the Shaykh al-Azhar, Jadd al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd al-Haqq, and the minister of religious endowments (*awqaf*), Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub. As Mahjub admitted, the difficulty Egypt faced in disseminating its vision of Islam stemmed from the country's dire economic state. Given Egypt's limited resources, it could extend little material support to Muslims abroad. Instead, it did its best to provide Muslim missionaries and literature wherever these were in short supply.[33] A growing measure of cooperation also characterized relations between Egypt's Ministry of Religious Endowments and the MWL. In their division of labor, the MWL provided finance and Egypt provided manpower to Islamic mosques and centers around the world.[34]

Egypt regarded Africa in particular as its realm of Islamic influence, and continued to invest resources in disseminating Egyptian Islam through personal contacts and the media. The African service of Egypt's state-run radio broadcast religious programs in Hausa, Yoruba, Wolof, Bambara, Swahili, Somali, and Afar. The content of these broadcasts was determined in consultation with those authorities in al-Azhar responsible for Islamic missionary activities abroad.[35] Numerous students from Black Africa also studied at al-Azhar, but very little scholarship money was available for them, and most lived in poverty. In August, a demonstration by these students demanding a rise in their stipends turned into a riot, in the course of which 24 buildings were destroyed in the dormitory city for foreigners.[36]

The Shaykh al-Azhar continued to pronounce himself ready to mediate an end to the war between Iran and Iraq.[37] After the Mecca incident (see below), Pakistan and Jordan apparently encouraged the shaykh to convene an international conference of Muslim *'ulama* to seek an end to the war.[38] Since Jadd al-Haqq had acquired a reputation for outspoken criticism of the Iranian regime (see *MECS* 1986, p. 135), it seemed probable that the actual intention was not to promote mediation at all, but to arrange the condemnation of Iran by the most authoritative Sunni gathering that could be assembled. The conference did not meet. By their professed positions both before and after the Mecca incident, the Shaykh al-Azhar and Egypt's other religious institutions expressed their solidarity with the campaign to isolate Iran. But they saw no reason to take the lead in this campaign and, by so doing, become the target of an intensified Iranian counterassault against their own standing in Islam.

Morocco, perhaps due to its distance from Iran and the traditional religious prestige of the monarchy, took a bolder stand against Iran. King Hasan did not hesitate to speak his mind on the inferior standing of the Shi'a in Islam. To Hasan's mind, the Shi'a did not represent a threat to the Arab world, but "the danger is in misleading the Africans and Asians." They might adopt Shi'ism out of naïveté: "They do not understand Arabic and they think that this is true Islam." Hasan called for a meeting of Sunni and Shi'i theologians to define the differences between the two schools and see whether a *modus vivendi* might be found.[39] Hasan also sponsored the

first "Islamic Conference for Friday Prayer Leaders (*khatibs*)" which met in Fez in April and attracted over 100 participants, particularly from Tunisia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This conference constituted a Sunni response to the conferences of Friday prayer leaders organized in the past by Iran. The Fez gathering took the position suggested to it by Hasan in his opening speech, in which he argued that purely political problems had no place in the Friday sermon — a position completely at odds with that of the Imam Khomeyni. In his speech to the conference, Hasan alluded to his view that the Iranians had distorted Islam because of their imperfect understanding of Arabic: "Knowing Arabic would avoid the emergence of a caste which would inescapably threaten the spontaneity of the daily cult by transforming itself into a clerical hierarchy."[40] In Hasan's view, just such a hierarchy misruled Iran.

The definitions of Islam embraced by all these gatherings were not necessarily narrow. Sunnis constituted 90% of all Muslims, most of whom felt quite comfortable with interpretations of Islam that emerged from conferences in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco. But these definitions constituted virtual excommunications of Shi'i Islam, and they fanned the prejudices that would burst into flames later in the year.

THE TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest of the Muslim fundamentalist schools, had been transnational in composition almost since its inception. Its branches, although often operating under various names, shared a set of common principles about aims and strategy. They favored the establishment of Islamic states throughout the Muslim world, but they were gradual rather than revolutionary in their approach. Most of these groups were involved in campaigns for the implementation of Islamic Law within existing political frameworks. At the same time, they extended moral and material assistance to Muslim "liberation" movements in armed confrontation with non-Muslim forces (as in Afghanistan and the Philippines). In recent years, leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood from many countries had found ways of promoting regular consultation by convening Islamic conferences. (For past examples, see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 174; 1986, p. 146.) Auspices were provided by the Islamic Council of Europe, an organization that promoted liaison between these groups. So extensive were the operations of this organization that it now billed itself as the World Islamic Council (*al-Majlis al-Islami al-'Alami*).

The World Islamic Council convened a conference in Khartoum from 2–4 February.[41] Former Saudi diplomat Salim 'Azzam, secretary-general of the council, arranged the conference with the active cooperation of Sudanese Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, great-grandson of the Sudanese Mahdi. Educated at Oxford, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi had cooperated with the Islamic Council of Europe before his rise to power. Numerous Muslim Brotherhood leaders attended the Khartoum conference, including Hasan al-Turabi (leader of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood); Khurshid Ahmad (disciple of the late Mawlana Mawdudi and theoretician of Islamic economics); Necmettin Erbakan (founder of Turkey's fundamentalist National Salvation Party); 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa (leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan); and Burhan al-Din Rabbani (Afghan resistance leader).

The conference debated the means to establish an Islamic order, and concluded with a final communiqué calling for the implementation of *Shari'a* law throughout the Muslim world and the liberation of all occupied Muslim lands. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi

also promised the implementation of Islamic Law in Sudan. An international Islamic conference devoted to this same question had been convened by Ja'far al-Numayri in September 1984, shortly before he was deposed from the presidency (see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 167). This new conference, convened with the support of the new regime, gathered a completely different crowd of fundamentalists to discuss the same issue. These activists were generally independent of state control, and they enjoyed recognized standing as theoreticians.

But many questions remained unanswered about their precise relationship with Saudi Arabia and especially their rumored flirtations with Iran.[42] Once again, rumors circulated about contacts between Iranian representatives and leading Muslim Brothers.[43] The spirit of ecumenism kindled in the 19th century by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani had not died out altogether in the Sunni Muslim world, surviving in certain fundamentalist movements that challenged official Islam; and Iran was not without success in opening channels to some of these movements (see below). But that spirit labored under the heavy weight of traditional prejudice, fanned by the high functionaries of state-sponsored Sunni Islam.

LIBYA'S ISLAMIC CALL

Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi continued his campaign to promote his highly idiosyncratic vision of Islam in lands beyond Libya. Libya had as much weight in world oil markets as it lacked importance in the historical evolution of Islam. Yet Qadhdhafi considered himself a final authority on Islam, enforcing his highly personal brand of the faith as state doctrine. The result was neither Sunnism nor Shi'ism, but a new synthesis of Qadhdhafi's own making.

Qadhdhafi employed two methods to spread his message. First, he was an indefatigable traveler, especially to Africa, and on these trips he took every opportunity to appear in mosques and define Islam.[44] Second, he sponsored the World Islamic Call Society (WICS; *Jam'iyyat al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyya*), the Tripoli-based missionary organization structured along the same lines as the Saudi MWL. (For recent developments in the WICS, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 293–94; 1982–83, p. 245; 1984–95, p. 161; 1986, pp. 146–47.) This organization constituted the principal channel for funneling Libyan support to Islamic groups elsewhere, especially in Africa and Southeast Asia.

The WICS intensified its activities in 1987. It organized "caravans" composed of preachers, doctors, and Arabic teachers, which were especially important in Africa, where they dispensed free medical care and religious preaching in equal measure. The WICS sponsored its own Islamic college in Libya (established in 1974), with branches in Damascus (established in 1982) and London (established in 1986). The college offered 104 scholarships in 1987, which were divided between nationals of 33 countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Since its establishment, the Tripoli center had graduated 350 preachers; its rapid growth had necessitated new facilities, which were scheduled for completion in 1987. The Damascus branch enrolled 800 students, and had graduated 154, some of whom joined the continuing activities of the WICS. This Syrian connection had particular significance, since its development complemented the close political ties between Libya and Syria. The WICS operated in Damascus with the support of the chief mufti of Syria, Shaykh Ahmad Kiftaru, who also visited

Libya during the year. The new London branch enrolled 25 students.[45] The WICS also sponsored its own Islamic schools and centers in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea, the Malagasy Republic, and Tanzania. It participated in the establishment of Islamic centers in Benin, Botswana, Mozambique, New Caledonia, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe. The WICS also supported "Islamic hospitals" in the Philippines and Bangladesh.[46]

In addition to lesser conferences organized during the year, the WICS convened the fifth session of its International Council in Tripoli from 15–19 June, and the sixth session in Malé, the capital of the Maldives, from 7–12 December.[47] During the Tripoli session, Qadhdhafi received the assembled guests in an elaborate tent set up for the occasion. On this and other occasions, Qadhdhafi outlined the ideological concepts of world politics embraced by the WICS, drawing a straightforward analogy between present-day Western governments and the Crusaders. The US, France, Britain, and Italy were reenacting the Crusades out of a fundamental religious antipathy to Islam, and the Muslims were duty bound to respond with *jihad*.[48]

Despite these efforts to promote his vision of Islam, the Libyan leader faced an Islamic opposition at home, and it too used the slogan of *jihad*. In one particularly vivid display of Muslim righteousness, six members of a clandestine *jihad* group — "enemies of God" — were hanged on Libyan television before a chanting crowd of teenagers.[49] (For details on opposition trends, see chapter on Libya.) As in Iran and Saudi Arabia, public punishment still accompanied persuasion in bids to define the precise contours of the faith — just as it had when the mystic Hallaj was put to death on the gibbet in 10th-century Baghdad.

IRAN'S MUSLIM MESSAGE

Iran continued to seek out constituencies among discontented Muslims beyond its frontiers. In doing so, it posed the most serious challenge to the Saudi bid for primacy in contemporary Islam. Yet, as 1987 unfolded, Iranians who favored the "export" of Islamic Revolution had to contend with several unexpected setbacks — on the war front in the Gulf, in Lebanon, in European capitals, and finally in Mecca. In each instance, Iran faced stiff resistance from those who did not wish to see it dictate the course of Islam. There was less and less official tolerance of Iranian activism, both in the wider Muslim world and in Europe. Muslim movements sympathetic toward Iran were subjected to campaigns of harassment, arrest, torture, deportation, and murder. Yet Iran could do very little on behalf of these Muslims. Encouraged by Iran to adopt militantly uncompromising positions, many Muslims in Iran's international network now found themselves under siege. The export of revolution had become a dangerous business. (On the past evolution of Iran's pan-Islamic policy, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 288–92; 1982–83, pp. 238–43; 1983–84, pp. 167–74; 1984–85, pp. 151–60; 1986, pp. 136–46. Iran's relations with Muslim movements are examined in this essay. For other aspects of Iran's regional policy, see chapter on Iran and essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War.)

The struggle within Iran over control of ties with Muslim movements did not abate. This contest pitted Khomeyni's designated successor, Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri, against Khomeyni's representative on the Supreme Defense Council, Hujjat al-Islam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. In 1987, one of Montazeri's players

was removed from the contest: the free-lance revolutionary, Mehdi Hashemi. Hashemi had coordinated a wide range of revolutionary activities in the Muslim world, with the support and acquiescence of Montazeri's bureau. His arrest in 1986 dealt a severe blow to Montazeri's own efforts to control this aspect of Iranian policy (see *MECS* 1986, p. 138). In September 1987, Hashemi was executed for his alleged crimes. But this did not deliver a decisive blow to Montazeri's continuing attempts to dominate the export of the revolution. The February 1987 publication of the Tower Commission's report on US-Iranian negotiations (see essay on the US and the Middle East) dealt a counterblow to Rafsanjani. This tended to even the score between them.[50] (For more on the domestic balance of power, see chapter on Iran.)

Hashemi's undoing was the work of Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri, who headed the Ministry of Intelligence and Internal Security (*Vezarate Ettela'at va Amniate Kishvar*; VEVAK), which came to play a growing role in the struggle over the state concession for exported revolution. (On Reyshahri's entry into the field, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 138–39.) According to a defecting Iranian who had worked in VEVAK,[51] Reyshahri took over Hashemi's task of liaison with foreign Muslims, by posting agents in Iranian embassies and in the field. It conducted much of this activity in Europe, through Iran's UN mission in Geneva, and also in Beirut. VEVAK reportedly had a monthly budget of $17m. to run its network, and closely coordinated its operations with the Foreign Ministry. VEVAK reportedly took over most of the functions of the Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Council, which had operated out of Montazeri's office. (On the council, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 173–74; 1984–85, p. 152.)

In fact, neither Rafsanjani nor Montazeri were in a position to control all the Iranian institutions and individuals in touch with Muslim movements in places as diverse as the southern suburbs of Beirut, the North African quarters of Paris, and the highlands of Afghanistan. These included not only VEVAK but also the Foreign Ministry, the Revolutionary Guards (RG), the Martyrs' Foundation, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, the personal representatives of Khomeyni and Montazeri, and numerous special emissaries. It was difficult to distinguish a clear chain of command in this thicket of revolutionary activism, although everyone entangled in it was convinced that his activities conformed to the will of Khomeyni.

The task of all these activists was made more difficult by the stalemate in the Gulf War. At the start of new offensives, such as "Karbala Five" early in the year, Iran conducted a parallel propaganda campaign, in this case to turn the much-touted drive on Basra to political advantage.[52] Iran especially directed this message at the Shi'is of Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Arab Gulf states, many of whom sat on the ideological fence awaiting the outcome of the struggle on the front. The majority of these Shi'is refused to be moved by the mere promise of victory, or even by initial gains in the first days or weeks of a major offensive. The export of the revolution therefore had to circumvent the stalemate in the war, and rely on every means of persuasion at Iran's disposal.

MUSLIM GUESTS IN TEHRAN

In Iran itself, the usual calendar of events — conferences, anniversaries, special occasions — brought numerous Muslim visitors to the country. Most of these were Shi'is who had visited the country several times. This was the case with the majority of

those who attended the fifth annual Conference on Islamic Thought in Tehran from 29–31 January. The Iranians aimed the gathering against the Islamic summit in Kuwait, which met at the same time, and which Iran refused to attend (see above). The participants condemned "all rigged meetings and conferences" — an obvious reference to the Islamic summit — and declared that all decisions by such bodies were "bereft of legal or religious legitimacy." The conferees also condemned Iraq's conduct of the war and the Iraqi regime, and pledged full support for Iran's Islamic Revolution and its leaders.[53] As in the past, the Lebanese Shi'i participants held a separate meeting with Montazeri.[54] The conference therefore did not differ in any respect from its predecessors. (On the previous conference, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 140–41.)

The annual conference was but one event by which Iran marked the anniversary of the revolution. Iran always invited numerous foreign Muslim guests to attend the anniversary celebrations, and one of these left a revealing account of his February 1987 visit.[55] Yusuf al-Badri, a Muslim Brother member of the Egyptian People's Assembly, wanted to be an envoy of peace in the Gulf. In visiting Iran, he also hoped to find "a true reflection of Islam." His Iranian escort recognized him on arrival: "As soon as he saw me he said: 'You are Shaykh Yusuf al-Badri. You were born at such and such a place, educated at such and such an institute, graduated from such and such a college, studied such and such a subject, and worked at such and such a school.'" Badri was interviewed on television and radio, and by the press. With other foreign guests, he attended a gathering addressed by Khomeyni in Tehran and visited Montazeri in Qom. The visit to Khomeyni's famous *husayniyya*, although a standard feature of such tours, did not appear on the program. "They woke us up just before dawn and took us to a square. Then they whispered in our ears, saying that we were going to visit Khomeyni." This technique was apparently meant to maximize the emotional impact of the encounter with Khomeyni.

Badri, like numerous other visitors, was favorably impressed by certain things, but his itinerary was carefully controlled. He was taken to visit model prisons and the homes of martyrs, but his hosts did not permit him to walk the streets unescorted. In Badri's case, certain remarks by his hosts against Egypt angered him, and he returned home with severe criticisms. But many other guests, especially Shi'is, came back with glowing reports. It was also clear from Badri's account that a systematic study of Muslim movements elsewhere had been made in Iran, and that Iran maintained dossiers on leading Muslim activists throughout the world.

The techniques of manipulative hospitality reported by Badri — flattery of the guest by detailed knowledge of his work, reception by leading political figures of persons who do not warrant such attention in their own countries, the over-organization of the itinerary to preclude random sightseeing, the visits to prisons reminiscent of Potemkin villages — imitated similar techniques first mastered by the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. The program of visits by foreigners (also arranged for potentially sympathetic non-Muslims) represented the cornerstone of the effort to export revolution by persuasion.[56]

Once persuaded, these Muslims had to be organized for action. In some cases, organizations already existed, and Iran formed alliances with them. But wherever possible, Iran organized sympathizers under its direct control. In 1987, the Iranian press called on Muslims to "shoulder their responsibilities and set up Hizballah resistance groups throughout the world."[57] The name Hizballah — the "Party of

God" — had been made famous in Lebanon, where it denoted an Iranian-supported faction of Lebanese Shi'is (see below). But in the lexicon of the Islamic Revolution, Hizballah was universally applicable to all who accepted Khomeyni as the absolute authority in temporal and spiritual matters. During 1987, statements began to appear in the name of branches of Hizballah in other countries. Hizballah of the Hijaz, in a statement from Beirut, claimed credit for an explosion at a Saudi gas plant that killed one person in August. The statement threatened to turn Saudi palaces and US warships into graves.[58] Hizballah of Kuwait also published its program, calling for the overthrow of the ruling house.[59] Already during the previous year, the creation of a Hizballah of Iraq had been reported (see *MECS* 1986, p. 145). Hizballah had never been confined to Lebanon; as a leader of Lebanon's Hizballah once explained, the Lebanese branch "is an extension of the aspirations of adherents of Hizballah throughout the Islamic world."[60] But while the transnational character of Hizballah had been asserted in theory, Iraqi, Saudi, and Kuwaiti Shi'i opposition groups were known by other names, even when they enjoyed Iranian support. The generalization of the term Hizballah appeared to be an Iranian attempt to bring order into the complicated world of Shi'i underground groups, and reflected Iran's wish to see all these groups submit to Iranian discipline. The size and structure of these other branches of Hizballah remained unknown, but it was noteworthy that the term saw increasing use outside Lebanon, as a generic designation for Muslims loyal to Khomeyni and principles of the Islamic Revolution.

IRAN IN LEBANON

The spreading use of the name Hizballah could be attributed to the fact that Lebanon's Hizballah was the most successful Iranian venture outside the country's borders. Between 1982 and 1987, Hizballah in Lebanon had grown unimpeded, at the expense of the rival Shi'i movement Amal, Lebanon's other sects, and those neighboring states that had interests in Lebanon. Hizballah relied for moral support on the preaching of a group of Lebanese Shi'i *'ulama* who had embraced the tenets of the Iranian Revolution with few or no reservations. According to one Shi'i cleric in Hizballah, the gains made by the movement during its first four years would have taken 50 years to achieve had it not been for Islamic Iran's support.[61] Hizballah's declared aim was the inclusion of Lebanon in one great Islamic state; its mission at this stage of the struggle was to organize supporters and undermine Israel's "security zone" in South Lebanon. (For Iran's role in the creation of Lebanon's Hizballah and the movement's growth, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 171–73; 1984–85, pp. 155–59; 1986, pp. 139–44.)[62]

Hizballah formally professed obedience, not to Iran, but to Khomeyni. The political theory to which Hizballah subscribed was the theory of government by the just jurisconsult, the *wali al-faqih*. This was the same theory elaborated by Khomeyni in his famous tract on Islamic government, and it was the theory enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its fundamental assumptions were Shi'i, in that it emphasized the passage of authority to the just jurisconsult in the absence of the Twelfth Imam. According to the leading clerics in Hizballah, the authority of the *wali al-faqih* knew no limits. As Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah explained in a lecture on the subject,

> the *faqih* is the guardian during the absence [of the Twelfth Imam], and the

> extent of his authority is wider than that of any other person... We must obey the *wali al-faqih*; disagreement with him is not permitted... his wisdom derives from God and the family of the Prophet, and he approaches the divine... When the *wali al-faqih* orders someone to obey and that person disobeys, that is insubordination against the imam. When the *wali al-faqih* orders that someone be obeyed, such obedience is obligatory.[63]

Iran's emissaries in Lebanon therefore spoke and acted in the name of the Imam Khomeyni. The Iranian Embassy in Beirut coordinated overall strategy with the Lebanese Shi'i clerics on whom Iran relied to convey its message in the local vernacular of Islam. In March 1987, Ahmad Dastmalchiyan took up his position as Iranian ambassador, the first Iranian ambassador posted to Beirut in four years.[64] (Lebanon had broken diplomatic ties in 1982 over the refusal of Iran to withdraw its RG.) Dastmalchiyan's task was to keep up the pretense of correct diplomacy while encouraging Hizballah to undermine the very government to which he was accredited.

But the question of whether Dastmalchiyan should present his credentials to Lebanese President Amin Jumayyil generated much heat in Hizballah. Most of the true believers opposed such a move, regarding it as Iranian recognition of the Lebanese Government. But others in the movement thought that in light of growing Syrian pressure on Hizballah (see below), the opening of a channel to the government might have advantages. In the end, Dastmalchiyan did present his credentials in a formal ceremony, leaving some of Iran's supporters in Hizballah befuddled. These published a statement expressing their "surprise" at seeing Dastmalchiyan appear before Jumayyil, who was "crowned by the Israeli invaders just as Antoine Lahad was crowned." Khomeyni had declared Jumayyil's government "illegal," they claimed, and this position had been officially conveyed to the Muslims of Lebanon. Dastmalchiyan's act contradicted the will of the imam.[65]

At the same time, Iran faced another sort of difficulty in Hizballah, with those who did not offer Khomeyni their blind allegiance. These found inspiration in the teachings of Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Fadlallah continued to deny any formal connection with Hizballah, but Iran depended on Fadlallah's brilliant Arabic rhetoric to carry its message to Hizballah and beyond. His popularity with the rank and file of the movement was undeniable, and rested upon his exceptional oratorical skill and a degree of erudition not matched by any cleric in Hizballah. But Fadlallah was an imperfect medium, for he had his own agenda, and he often spoke and acted without consulting Iran. Because Fadlallah spoke only for himself and not for Hizballah, it could never be assumed that his specific positions represented any significant body of opinion within the movement.

Fadlallah's original formulations were sometimes models of lucidity, and at other times nearly impenetrable. But he had a fairly straightforward view of the authority of Khomeyni. Fadlallah respected and admired the leader of the Islamic Revolution. "The Imam Khomeyni represents an authority. He is a great and inspiring Islamic leader, and, as such, we hold him in high esteem, and believe that he represents a mature and inspiring Islamic leadership."[66] Yet by this short profession of admiration, Fadlallah dissented from the absolute allegiance offered by the clerics of Hizballah. Khomeyni represented "an authority" but not the sole or absolute authority for Muslims everywhere. He was "inspiring" but not divinely inspired. It was indeed rare

for Fadlallah even to mention Khomeyni unless specifically asked for an opinion by an interviewer. Unlike most of Hizballah's clerics, professions of allegiance to Khomeyni were not part of his repertoire.

Reports circulated during the year that Iran had decided to cut back on support for Fadlallah, whose independence did not suit its taste.[67] In truth, Fadlallah inspired confidence in some Iranians, contempt in others. He enjoyed the support of Dastmalchiyan, and had good ties with Rafsanjani. But Montazeri's supporters and some of the younger clerics in Hizballah suspected Fadlallah of insufficient zeal for Khomeyni and the tenets of the Islamic Revolution. This conflict came to the surface in the debate over hostage-holding in Hizballah. Fadlallah believed that the holding of hostages harmed Hizballah's cause and encouraged those Syrians who wanted to destroy the movement. But other clerics in Hizballah had a vested interest in kidnapping, which they had encouraged and sanctioned.[68] They began to criticize Fadlallah, arguing that Hizballah was waging an "open war" (*ma'raka maftuha*) — a total war — against the West. Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, angered by Fadlallah's criticism of kidnapping, asked why certain persons criticized the kidnappings more often than they denounced Israel's "crimes." The battle waged by Hizballah was an "open" one, declared Amin, and the oppressed had a right to confront the US (as well as France and Israel) "with the relevant methods they choose." As Amin pointed out, Khomeyni himself had not condemned the kidnappings in Lebanon, just as he had acquiesced in the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979. "The imam neither protested this action nor said it was wrong."[69] For Amin, this constituted inferential evidence that kidnapping was a permissible and even commendable way of conducting a political struggle.

The debate in Hizballah over Khomeyni's true will found no resolution. But it did not occur in a vacuum. Various Iranian emissaries dispensed economic and military assistance to Hizballah, and they also interpreted Khomeyni's will for their clients. A remarkably candid account of the economic aid appeared in a January interview with the general director of the Beirut office of the Martyrs' Foundation.[70] The foundation's purpose in Lebanon, according to this official, was to meet all the needs of dependents of persons killed or wounded either while "fighting Israel or its agents" or as a result of such fighting. The fighter could go to battle knowing that if he were "martyred," his family would be cared for. According to the figures published on this occasion, the Martyrs' Foundation had spent £L78.5m. in Lebanon during the four-year period from late 1982 to late 1986. This included monthly pensions for the families of "martyrs" — supporters of Hizballah killed in the line of duty or in the cross-fire. The widow of a civilian martyr received £L800 a month, and £L150 for each child; if her husband was killed fighting in Hizballah's ranks, she received an additional £L1,000 a month. The foundation paid 70% of the medical expenses of injured civilians, and 100% of the medical expenses of wounded fighters. In 1984, the foundation established a girls' vocational school for the daughters of martyrs, where they learned English, typing, sewing, knitting, Islamic culture, and Qur'an. A similar institution was later opened in the Biqa' Valley. The foundation also funded several workshops which employed dependents of martyrs. The foundation subsidized the purchase of schoolbooks, school supplies, and covered the repair of homes damaged in Israeli or other attacks. It also covered the costs of visits to Iran and to the Shi'i shrine of Zaynab in Damascus.[71] From its two offices in Beirut, the foundation supervised

branch offices in Ba'albak, the western Biqa', Tripoli, Tyre, and Nabatiyya. This influx of funds was supplemented by other sources; reports spoke of a special disbursement of $90m. made by Iran to people in the security branch of Hizballah.[72] These sums had an impact in a country where the government had ceased to offer many basic social services. But all the benefits provided by the Martyrs' Foundation served the *jihad*, not the Lebanese State.

Military training and supply remained the responsibility of the Iranian RG, who conducted regular training courses in camps in the Biqa' Valley. During 1987, the RG also took up residence outside the Biqa' Valley, in the port city of Tyre in South Lebanon.[73] Through this move, Iran hoped to expand its influence in South Lebanon, where it had the fewest cadres and faced the stiff opposition of the rival Shi'i militia, Amal. But it did not engage in direct action against the South Lebanese Army or Israeli forces. There seemed to be an Iranian reluctance to enter situations where Iranian and Israeli forces might clash, especially on ground where Israel had a clear advantage. And so the RG could only promise to join the Islamic Resistance on the field of battle after the RG had triumphed on Islam's other front. According to Husayn al-Musawi, leader of Islamic Amal (an element of Hizballah), the RG were under orders not to engage Israel directly, since "they are far from supply routes." But once victory was achieved in the Gulf, those routes would be shortened, and the RG would become "the vanguard of the holy struggle which will liberate Jerusalem... They will form the main army that will do the fighting, but the circumstances are not ripe for that now."[74] The Iranian slogan that the road to Jerusalem led through Baghdad had operative significance. "Saddam [Husayn] will fail," declared Hizballah spokesman Ibrahim al-Amin during Iran's "Karbala Five"offensive against Basra early in 1987. "We must ready ourselves to become soldiers in the Army of Jerusalem."[75]

But before Hizballah could join the "Army of Jerusalem," it had to deal with the armies of Damascus, which already controlled Iran's access to Hizballah via the Biqa' Valley. Syria and Hizballah had clashed before in the Biqa' Valley, but now the locus of conflict shifted to West Beirut. Nothing so threatened the continued growth of the movement as the confrontation with Syria, which viewed Hizballah's calls for an Islamic Lebanon with plain hostility. (For past Syrian-Hizballah tension, see *MECS* 1986, p. 143. For the Syrian move on West Beirut in the Syrian and Lebanese contexts, see chapters on Syria and Lebanon.)

On 24 February, Syrian forces and Hizballah clashed as never before, after 7,000 Syrian troops entered West Beirut in force and issued an ultimatum to the various armed factions to evacuate their headquarters. According to Syria's version of the events, its forces came under fire from members of Hizballah at the movement's Fathallah barracks.[76] Hizballah's account differed in every respect. According to Hizballah's statement, its members had actually evacuated the Fathallah barracks, but the Syrians then entered an adjacent building where Hizballah members had taken refuge.[77] Fadlallah insisted that "not one shot was fired at the Syrians. It was a cold-blooded massacre."[78] In any event, 23 members of Hizballah died at Syrian hands.

The killings had a tremendous impact in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Some 50,000 people attended the funerals of the victims. Two days after the killings, the leading figures in Hizballah assembled to review the events. At the end of their deliberations, they issued a statement declaring that what had occurred was not a

"security incident," as the Syrians would have it, but an unjustifiable massacre.[79] A number of individuals made still more impassioned statements in the immediate aftermath of the killings, and anti-Syrian sentiment reached a peak in the southern suburbs.[80]

Paradoxically, the entry of Syrian troops into West Beirut and the virtual Syrian siege of the southern suburbs had a sobering effect on the leaders of Hizballah. They did not forget the Syrian regime's siege of the provincial city of Hamah in 1982, or Syria's ruthless handling of Muslim fundamentalist opposition in Tripoli in 1985 and 1986. Most of Hizballah's leaders accordingly urged restraint on their followers. Fadlallah, while taking a firm position that the incident was indeed a massacre, called not for revenge but for the trial of those Syrian troops who had committed the crime. Iran also sent an emissary to Damascus in the person of Interior Minister 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemipur, a former ambassador to Syria and one of the chief architects of the Syrian-Iranian alliance.[81] And a month after the clash, Syrian President Asad met for three hours with Hizballah's principal leaders.[82] According to one participant in that meeting, Hizballah's "Syrian brothers" declared the Fathallah massacre "an isolated incident resulting from an erroneous reaction."[83] The Syrians, in a reversal, had discreetly admitted error, and Hizballah stopped insinuating that the massacre was a premeditated act. The breakdown of the alliance had been averted. But the episode could only remind Hizballah how much its vision of an Islamic Lebanon depended on the goodwill of Asad's Arab nationalist, Ba'thist regime.

For Hizballah, the confrontation with Syria applied a break to the movement's remarkable growth. From the outset, Hizballah had sought to escape Syria's stifling grip. Established in the Biqa' Valley, Hizballah shifted its center to Beirut in order to escape Syrian control. In 1987, Syria came to Beirut and placed Hizballah under virtual siege on several occasions, leading Hizballah to seek alternative refuge in South Lebanon. But Hizballah faced a formidable opponent there in the form of Syria's client, Amal, and confrontation loomed on the horizon. Lebanon had been Iran's great success story in the export of revolution, and a compensation for frustration in the Gulf War. But now serious obstacles blocked Iran in Lebanon; Hizballah's halcyon days were over.

IRAN'S LESSER CLIENTS

Iran's material and emotional investment in Lebanon's Hizballah far surpassed its support for any other Muslim movement. But Iran had a wide regional agenda, and it sought ties with other Muslim groups — Shi'i and Sunni — which were prepared to accept the wisdom and, ultimately, the guidance of Iran.

Certainly the oldest of these partnerships involved the Iraqi Shi'i opposition to the regime of Saddam Husayn. Since the outbreak of the war, most of the leaders of this opposition had taken refuge in Tehran, where Iranian controllers kept them on a tight leash. (On Iran and the Iraqi Shi'i opposition, see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 151–52; 1986, pp. 144–45.) In 1987, new evidence surfaced of disillusionment in the ranks of the Iraqi Shi'i opposition groups, which were concerned about their continued independence and that of their country in the event of an Iranian victory. This sentiment especially affected the veterans of the independent-minded *Da'wa* movement, which had arisen years before Iran's Islamic Revolution. Many of these activists refused to acknowledge Khomeyni's absolute authority, and some chose to

operate in Europe. But the principal figures in the Iraqi Shi'i opposition remained in Tehran, under the nominal leadership of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI). In his opinion, "to locate ourselves in Europe would reduce our struggle to mere rhetoric, a war fought in symposiums or forums, confined to theoretical debates and empty slogans."[84]

But by the end of 1987, serious differences had arisen between the Iraqi Shi'i exiles and their Iranian hosts. Iran did not permit SAIRI to distribute its newspaper, *al-Shahada*, to Iraqi prisoners of war. Schools set up by the Iraqi exiles were shut by the Iranian authorities. Iraqi Shi'i units which fought on the front alongside Iranian units complained of discrimination in the provision of matériel. And Iraqi exiles were subjected to interrogation at Tehran Airport before being allowed to travel.[85] The ranks of the Iraqi Shi'i opposition also remained divided, between adherents of *al-Da'wa* and the smaller Islamic Action Organization (*Munazzamat al-'Amal al-Islami*). (On their differences, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 170–71; 1986, pp. 144–45.) The latter group, also based in Tehran, was strongly pan-Islamic and more subservient to Khomeyni's line. It published many communiqués on military actions it had allegedly undertaken within Iraqi territory, in a bid to establish its credentials as an element in any future Islamic government in all or part of Iraq.

In the past, Iran's ties with Sunni movements had been limited to the Islamic Unification Movement (*Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami*) of Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban in Tripoli, Lebanon. (For the background of this relationship, see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 157.) Sha'ban continued to receive Iranian support. An office of the Martyrs' Foundation operated in Tripoli, and provided the families of Sunni martyrs with the same aid dispensed to Shi'i martyrs elsewhere in Lebanon.[86] But Sha'ban played an ambiguous role during the year. He continued to profess allegiance to Iran, and met with numerous Iranian officials. But he also began to build bridges to the Saudis, most notably during his attendance at the pilgrimage. After the Mecca incident (see below), Sha'ban met with the Saudi interior minister, Prince Na'if Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, with the MWL secretary-general, 'Abdallah 'Umar Nasif, and even with the greatest foe of Shi'ism, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Baz.[87] According to Sha'ban's own account, he hoped to serve as an instrument for the reconciliation of Sunnis and Shi'is, and he acted with the full knowledge of Iran.[88] But his long stay in Saudi Arabia aroused the suspicions of some in Hizballah, who felt that Sha'ban wanted to play both sides of the court.[89]

The MWL invited Sha'ban to return to Mecca in October for a conference, and he accepted. But when he realized that the conference (discussed below) would be a clear-cut demonstration against Iran, he bowed out, urging the conference to adopt ecumenical resolutions and to send delegations to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran.[90] Sha'ban then attended a counterconference in Tehran (also discussed below), where he announced that Iran represented the only regime based on true Islamic ideas and principles.[91] Still, Sha'ban openly dissented from the Iranian demand that Mecca be turned over to an international Muslim body.[92] Despite the intensification of sectarian antagonisms, Islamic Iran managed to hold on to the allegiance of Sha'ban, but it was not clear how long he would remain firmly in Iran's camp.

However, by 1987 Iran's ties with Sunnis did not remain confined to Sha'ban. Iran made a special effort to establish links with Islamic movements in Egypt and Tunisia, in the conviction that both countries were in a prerevolutionary state. The US

reportedly leaked an intelligence report to the Egyptian authorities that contained many details of Iran's ties with Egyptian fundamentalists. According to the report, several of these Egyptians visited Tehran in February (in connection with the revolution's anniversary celebrations; see above). There they agreed to prepare a comprehensive study on establishing a branch of Hizballah in Egypt, to be submitted to Iran's minister of intelligence and internal security, Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri (on whom, see above). According to the US report, the principal channel for Iranian support of Egyptian fundamentalists was the Iranian Interests Office in Cairo, under one Mahmud Mohtadi.[93] On 13 May, Egypt closed the office and ordered Mohtadi to leave.[94] Egyptian security authorities subsequently arrested members of two "terrorist" groups allegedly connected with Iran.[95] Skeptics argued that Egypt's Interior Ministry simply wished to discredit these groups and other individuals by associating them with Iran.[96] But while the extent of actual Iranian involvement was difficult to determine, an ideological affinity undoubtedly existed between Iran and radical fundamentalists in Egypt.

In March, Tunisian security authorities arrested many members of the Islamic Tendency Movement (*Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami*; known widely by the French acronym of its name, MTI).[97] These arrests included the leader of the movement, Rashid al-Ghanushi. Tunisian authorities in the past had argued that a link existed between the MTI and Iran (see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 160). Following the 1987 arrests, the authorities again made the same charge, claiming that the Iranian Embassy in Tunis had made payments to an MTI member. An MTI leader who had taken refuge in France, and spoke on behalf of the movement, denied that the MTI maintained any such connection, and claimed that the Tunisian authorities made up the charge to discredit the movement.[98] In his own interrogation, Ghanushi made no reference to Iran.[99] But the Iranian media took up the MTI's cause, and the Beirut-based Islamic Jihad threatened the Tunisian Government with retaliation before and after two MTI members were executed in October.[100]

In a separate affair, six Tunisians (who were not connected with the MTI) were arrested in Paris in March, in connection with the breakup of a violent cell that had carried out the bombings which terrorized Paris between December 1985 and September 1986. The controller of this ring was an Iranian intelligence official in the guise of an embassy interpreter, but the actual operatives included Lebanese Shi'is, Tunisians, and Moroccans. They were employed by Iran as additional instruments of low-intensity warfare against France, alongside the continued holding of French hostages in Lebanon. (On the crisis in Iranian-French relations, see chapter on Iran.) Iran was known to use Lebanese and Iraqi Shi'is for such operations, but the presence of Tunisians in the ring represented a breakthrough for Iran, and Tunis responded by severing relations with Tehran. According to the Tunisian authorities, Iran's diplomats in Tunis had circulated tracts calling for the overthrow of the government, recruited followers in the university and mosques, and sent Tunisian fundamentalists on visits to Iran.[101] But even after relations were severed, the Tunisian authorities continued to uncover what they called "Khomeyniite" groups.[102]

Through support for Sunni fundamentalist groups in Egypt and Tunisia, Iran sought to bridge the gap between Sunni and Shi'i Islam and win a wider following in the Muslim world. The search for the second Islamic revolution, which began in Iraq and then encompassed Lebanon, had reached Sunni ground. But just as Iran began to

break down the sectarian divide, events in Mecca unleashed the full force of the pent-up sectarian hatreds.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1987: DEATH IN MECCA

Since Iran's revolution, the pilgrimage had been a source of persistent conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Each year, Iran sought to transform the pilgrimage into a demonstration of solidarity against the enemies of Islam — who, by definition, were Iran's own adversaries. The Saudis sought to restrict pilgrims to their religious rites, even as they made subtle propaganda among them. In the very first years after the Iranian Revolution, violent clashes between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security authorities were commonplace. Later Iran and Saudi Arabia had reached an informal understanding which regulated their conduct. As the pilgrimage season of 1987 drew near, there seemed to be no cause to conclude that this understanding would not be respected. Indeed, the past two seasons had been marked by a high level of cooperation between the Saudi authorities and Iranian pilgrims. (For the development of the pilgrimage controversy since Iran's revolution, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 284–88, 301–3; 1982–83, pp. 238, 249–51; 1983–84, pp. 175–77; 1984–85, pp. 161–64; 1986, pp. 149–51. This chapter reconstructs the course of events during the 1987 pilgrimage. For the impact in Saudi Arabia and Iran and additional information, see chapters on Saudi Arabia and Iran.)[103]

Nonetheless, the Saudi authorities were alarmed by a speech made at the beginning of July by Hujjat al-Islam Musavi-Kho'iniha, Khomeyni's former pilgrimage representative. Kho'iniha had presided over the most turbulent pilgrimage seasons. His replacement as pilgrimage supervisor and his appointment as prosecutor-general in 1985 was probably intended to reduce the chances of confrontation in Mecca. But he was still a powerful figure in Iran and a champion of extremists who opposed all limitations on Iran's pilgrims. His speech was plainly provocative. This year, he declared, "a mere march or demonstration will not suffice." Iran should not simply "gather a certain number of people who might support the views of the Islamic Republic." Kho'iniha demanded that Saudi Arabia allow Khomeyni's pilgrimage representative to enter the Great Mosque in Mecca for one night, and there conduct a referendum among the throngs of pilgrims over the decision of the emir of Kuwait to invite foreign escorts for Kuwaiti tankers (see chapter on the Gulf states). At the same time, Khomeyni's representative would explain Iran's case in the Gulf War. "All we ask is that the Saudi Government not oppose this, nor send its guards to the Great Mosque. Let us see what happens. We will try it for one year."[104]

The Saudi authorities now had grounds to suspect that some of Iran's pilgrims might attempt a takeover of the Great Mosque, as a political maneuver to score points against Kuwait and the US. Kho'iniha's statement touched a raw nerve, and immediately elicited a warning from an unnamed official source in Saudi Arabia. The source noted that Saudi Arabia supported numerous other forums for the expression of Muslim opinion on various matters, even during the pilgrimage. But such consultations in the Great Mosque would constitute an innovation in Islam, and "anyone who attempts to innovate in Islam will go to hell." Saudi Arabia would shoulder its responsibility for safeguarding the Islamic shrines in Mecca and Medina.[105] Kho'iniha's statement put the Saudi security apparatus on a high state of alert.

But Kho'iniha's demand did not figure in the negotiations between the Saudi Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs and Khomeyni's official pilgrimage representative, Mehdi Karrubi. As Khomeyni's spokesman, Karrubi asked only that Iran be allowed to conduct its demonstration in Mecca as in past years. An Iranian official even covered the route of the planned demonstration with a Saudi official, and it clearly ended 1.5 km. short of the Great Mosque. But the Saudi authorities remained deeply suspicious, and pressured Karrubi to cancel the march, lest violence break out. On the eve of the demonstration, Karrubi refused to cancel it, and declared that "in the event of disorder and disruption, the responsibility for this will be fully with the Saudi Government."[106] Two days before the planned demonstration, the Iranian media published Khomeyni's annual message to the pilgrims. While longer and more high-strung than the messages of recent years, it did not constitute a major departure from the understanding regarding the pilgrimage itself. Khomeyni included the customary plea to pilgrims that they "avoid clashes, insults, and disputes," and warned against those intent on disruption "who might embark on spontaneous moves."[107]

On the afternoon of 31 July, the demonstration in Mecca began in the usual fashion, with slogans and speeches. The march commenced upon the conclusion of the speeches; as in the past, it was led by *chador*-clad women and war invalids. At or near the end of the planned route, the march came upon a cordon of Saudi riot police and National Guardsmen who refused to allow the procession to go any further. This dangerous situation became explosive in the wake of two developments. Some within the crowd of Iranian pilgrims chose this moment to echo Kho'iniha's provocative demand, and called upon the marchers to continue to the Great Mosque. At the same time, unidentified persons in an adjacent parking garage began to pelt the Iranian demonstrators with bricks, pieces of concrete, and iron bars. This exacerbated the situation on the confrontation line between the pilgrims and the police, and both sides began to exchange blows, the police using truncheons and electric prods, the demonstrators using sticks, knives, and rocks. Because Karrubi and the other Iranian officials had not positioned themselves at the head of the march, they had no control over the conduct of Iran's pilgrims at the crucial point of contact with Saudi police. During the ensuing confrontation, the Saudis backed down temporarily, and the crowd surged forward. According to American intelligence sources, the tide was finally turned by reinforcements from the National Guard, who fired teargas shells into the crowd and then opened fire with pistols and automatic weapons.[108] The Saudis have denied firing on the demonstrators or even using teargas, claiming instead that the demonstrators, once dispersed, surged in retreat. According to the Saudis, those who died were trampled to death. According to official Saudi figures, 402 people died in the clash, including 275 Iranian pilgrims, 85 Saudi police, and 42 pilgrims from other countries. Iran claimed that 400 Iranian pilgrims died, and that several thousand were injured.

This reconstruction rests upon a selective reading of the contradictory accounts provided by Iranian and Saudi sources.[109] As no independent investigation will ever be conducted, important details will remain in doubt. But no evidence has been produced by Saudi Arabia or Iran to establish that the other side acted deliberately or with premeditation in order to provoke violence. The evidence now available indicates that a group of undisciplined Iranian pilgrims, acting under the influence of at least one provocative statement by a leading Iranian official, wished to enter the Great

Mosque as demonstrators. The Saudi security authorities, who had been alerted to this possibility but lacked self-confidence in the face of provocation, employed excessive force to thwart the Iranian crowd.

While the cause is open to dispute, there could be no doubt about the effect of the deaths at Mecca in revalidating hoary prejudices. The accusations that flew in every direction after the incident had few parallels in their intensity. The Saudis sought to remind Sunnis of an old piece of Sunni lore which holds that Shi'is are obliged by their belief to defile holy shrines. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Na'if Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz relied upon Sunni prejudice when he charged that the real objective of the Iranian pilgrims was "to spoil the pilgrimage, because, as is known, the pilgrimage is done only if the Great Mosque is entered." Iranian "sedition" inside the Great Mosque would have made it impossible for other pilgrims to have carried out the required circumambulations in the Great Mosque. "The pilgrimage would have been spoilt."[110] There is no evidence that the Iranian demonstrators, even those who wished to carry their protest into the Great Mosque, intended to ruin the rite for other pilgrims. But, by his charge, Na'if sought to associate the Iranian demonstrators with the legendary Shi'i "defilers" of the Great Mosque.

Iranian statements pandered to the belief still held by Shi'is that the fanatic Saudis were driven by their own misguided beliefs to kill innocent Shi'i pilgrims. Khomeyni declared that the Saudi rulers, "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back," and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics."[111] Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what Rafsanjani called "Wahhabi hooligans." Rafsanjani recalled the 19th-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi'is) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi'is), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi'i works). The Wahhabis "will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history."[112] This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds.

It is impossible here to discuss the full range of reactions by governments, movements, and individuals across the vast expanse of Islam. Many more themes emerged in this vicious polemic. But, as a rule, Muslims tended to interpret the deaths in Mecca within their respective sectarian traditions, a fact underlined in the attempts of Saudi Arabia and Iran to explain their arguments to other Muslims in rival Islamic conferences.

DUELING CONFERENCES AFTER MECCA

Following the Mecca tragedy, both Saudi Arabia and Iran conducted large-scale campaigns to influence Muslim opinion abroad. The Saudi Government entrusted the task in large part to the MWL (see above), which convened its "Third General Islamic Conference" from 11–15 October. Despite the title given to this assembly, it constituted an extraordinary session. By its (revised) constitution, the MWL was supposed to convene such a "general" conference every five years, and the conference was supposed to select the members of the MWL's governing Constituent Council. In practice, the MWL had long ceased to convene such conferences: the first met in 1962,

the second in 1965.[113] Since that time, the Constituent Council had been self-perpetuating. But following the killings in Mecca, the moment had come for the MWL to call upon all those who owed it a debt, and so it convened a forum that had been moribund for 22 years.

More than 600 supporters and clients of the MWL from 134 countries attended the conference. The event was opened by Saudi King Fahd, who explained that the MWL and other bodies had the new responsibility of protecting Islamic societies against extremism, insensibility, and abnormal practices — all transparent references to the alleged conduct of Iran.[114] As expected, the conference decided to condemn Iran alone for the Mecca incident: the Iranian Government — a government "accustomed to terrorism and a thirst for Muslim blood" — "solely bears the responsibility for the outrage in God's holy mosque." The measures taken by the Saudi authorities "to quell the sedition and to contain the fires of wickedness were legitimate." Finally, the conferees called upon the Saudi Government to bar entry to any group, Iranian or non-Iranian, that did not respect the sanctity of the pilgrimage and adhere to Saudi regulations for public security.[115] The conference thus served the dual purpose of legitimizing the Saudi measures to quell the Iranian riot, and sanctioning any future Saudi decision to bar Iran's pilgrims from the country.

The conference was immediately attacked by Iran as one more attempt by the Saudis to "buy the religion of Muslims."[116] Shi'i opposition sources embarked on a renewed campaign to discredit the MWL, charging that the Saudis had spent $470m. on the conference, and that total expenses were liable to reach $700m.[117] They claimed that the missionary enterprise of the MWL was not to save Muslims from conversion to Christianity, but to battle Shi'ism everywhere.[118] The conference, far from being Islamic, had a narrow Sunni, Wahhabi, and Saudi orientation, said its critics; it was a conference of men of religion who served the rulers, not the religion.[119]

Iran responded in kind by convening an "International Congress on Safeguarding the Sanctity and Security of the Holy *Haram*," under the auspices of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and the Foreign Ministry. When Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati announced that the conference would be convened, he said it would explore ways of entrusting the superintendence of the holy shrines in Mecca and Medina to an organization of Muslim nations.[120] The conference, which met from 23–27 November in Tehran, did precisely that.[121]

In opening the gathering of 300 participants from 36 countries, Iranian President 'Ali Khameneh'i declared Mecca unsafe under Saudi custodianship, and urged the participants to seek a solution.[122] Rafsanjani went still further in his address to the delegates, calling for the "liberation" of Mecca and the establishment of an "Islamic International" which would govern Mecca as a free city. Were the Saudis to set up a "competent government," it would not be necessary to separate Mecca from the rest of Arabia, but the existing regime in the holy cities was unacceptable.[123] Ayatollah Montazeri, who met with the foreign guests, gave a broadly political speech, denouncing the Saudis as "a bunch of English agents from Najd who have no respect either for the House of God or for the pilgrims who are the guests of God." Just as Jerusalem would be liberated from the "claws of usurping Israel," Mecca and Medina would be liberated from the "claws of Al Sa'ud."[124] Participants included Lebanon's Fadlallah and other Hizballah figures; Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban; SAIRI leader

Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim; Pakistani Shi'i leader 'Arif al-Husayni; and the director of the Muslim Institute in London, Kalim Siddiqui.

The resolutions of the conference declared Khomeyni to be "the only leader in the Islamic world who can save the Islamic nation and bring about its unity." The participants demanded that Mecca be placed under the rule of men of religion, whose administration would be established by an Islamic conference "to be convened soon." One resolution declared that the naming of an Islamic land after the "corrupt" Saudi family constituted "an insult to the religion itself"; another called on the Muslim clerics who had "sold their religion to the Saudi rulers" to repent their error. Finally, the conference resolved to establish a permanent secretariat to supervise the implementation of its resolutions.[125]

The gatherings organized by the Saudi-backed MWL and Iran's Ministry of Islamic Guidance were not convened to heal the old sectarian wound opened at Mecca. By these two conferences, Saudi Arabia and Iran sought to exclude each other from Islam itself, by securing the approval of Muslims from throughout the world. It was precisely in anticipation of such a confrontation that Saudi Arabia and Iran had built extensive networks of Islamic support and sympathy throughout the world. They now brought every asset into play.

By the year's end, the Muslim world had advanced by the largest possible stride toward a state of absolute division. This had only meant bloodshed. Iran had tested the limits in Beirut and Mecca; in doing so, it had set the stage for two massacres of those whom it had mobilized in its bid for Muslim primacy. The cold-blooded shootings in Beirut and Mecca established beyond doubt that Iran's opponents in the Arab world would not hesitate to reenact the tragic drama of Karbala when threatened.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. For another account of the summit, see Avriel Butovsky, "The Fifth Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference", *IJA Research Reports*, May 1987.
2. Husayn's speech, R. Amman, 27 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
3. Text of committee statement, SPA, 11 November — DR, 13 November 1986.
4. IRNA, 28 December — SWB, 30 December 1986.
5. *IHT*, 21–22 March 1987.
6. AFP, 22 January — DR, 22 January; AFP, 24, 25 January — DR, 27 January; *NYT*, 1 February 1987.
7. Breakdown in *Le Monde*, 28 January 1987.
8. *FR*, 26 March 1987. The amount of the "bribe" is put here at $500m.
9. Details of the encounter in *al-Ahram*, 29, 30 January; *October*, 1 February; *al-Qabas*, 4 February 1987.
10. Although Syria, in a pro forma manner, proposed that the ICO "reconsider" Egypt's membership in the agenda-drafting preliminaries to the summit. Egypt, in a countermove, proposed condemnation of Syria for human rights violations. Both proposals were swiftly defeated, as Syria and Egypt knew they would be. KUNA, 21 January — DR, 22 January; *Akhir Sa'a*, 28 January 1987.
11. Asad's speech, Damascus TV, 27 January — DR, 29 January; Damascus TV, 28 January — DR, 4 February 1987.

12. Mubarak's remarks prior to summit, MENA, 19 January — DR, 20 January 1987. Egypt claimed to possess proof that, beginning in 1982, Rif'at al-Asad and other Syrian official figures had met with Ariel Sharon, then Israel's defense minister, and other Israeli officials. On Egypt's charges, see *al-Musawwar*, 30 January; *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 17 February 1987.
13. Text of resolution, KUNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January 1987.
14. Text of resolution, KUNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January 1987.
15. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 18 July; *al-Bayadir al-Siyasi*, 15 August 1987.
16. KUNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January 1987.
17. Tass, 25 January 1987.
18. Text of resolution, KUNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January 1987.
19. Tass, 3 February 1987.
20. *Pravda*, 7 February, quoted by Tass, 7 February 1987.
21. Visit reported in *Saudi Gazette*, 12 February 1987.
22. Tass, 2 March 1987.
23. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 26 January 1987.
24. Sabah's speech, KUNA, 22 January — DR, 23 January 1987.
25. Husayn's speech, R. Amman, 27 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
26. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 20 August 1987.
27. *MM*, 19 January 1987.
28. *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 25 November 1987.
29. *Al-Liwa al-Islami*, 3 September 1987.
30. Details on the ISF's difficulties, *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, Kuwait, 23 January 1987.
31. The MWL is the subject of a thorough *Habilitationsschrift* recently completed by Dr. Reinhard Schulze.
32. Details and figures from special 25th anniversary issue of *Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami*, 5 October 1987. Still, MWL Secretary-General Dr. 'Umar Nasif, in the same issue, complained of an insufficient budget, a lack of efficient workers, and the absence of readiness for voluntary work among members of Muslim communities.
33. Interview with Mahjub, *Sawt al-'Arab*, 4 January 1987.
34. See report on Mahjub's meeting with Nasif, *al-Ahram*, 3 September 1987.
35. *Al-Nur*, 5 August 1987.
36. *Al-Ahram*, 9 August; *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 19 August 1987.
37. *Al-Idha'a wa'l-Tilifizyun*, 13 December 1986.
38. *Al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 28 September; *al-Liwa al-Islami*, 1 October 1987.
39. Interview with King Hasan, *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 4 November 1987.
40. *JP*, 15 April; additional details in *Majallat al-Azhar*, May 1987.
41. Details in *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 3, 5 February 1987.
42. According to certain sources, the meetings in Ahmad Ben Bella's apartment in Lausanne in May 1986 (reported in *MECS* 1986, p. 146) were attended by Salim 'Azzam, Fadlallah, and an Iranian intelligence official; *Insight*, 8 September 1987.
43. *NAD*, 23 November 1987, reported that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din was in contact with Iranian officials in Geneva.
44. These mosque visits abroad are catalogued in *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 2 September 1987.
45. Details on the college and its branches, *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 2 September 1987.
46. *Al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 13 May 1987.
47. *Al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 18, 20, 23, 25 June; *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 9 December 1987.
48. See Qadhdhafi's speech to the conference of the WICS's preachers in West Africa, R. Tripoli, 12 January — DR, 13 January 1987.
49. Tripoli TV, 17 February — SWB, 19 February 1987.
50. For perceptive accounts of developments in the Rafsanjani-Montazeri struggle, see *Le Monde*, 8 April; *The Economist*, 9 May 1987.
51. *The Washington Times*, 10 July 1987.
52. See, for example, *al-'Ahd*, 16, 23, 30 January 1987.
53. R. Tehran, 1 February — SWB, 3 February 1987.
54. *Al-'Ahd*, 30 January 1987.
55. Interview with Yusuf al-Badri, *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 18 September 1987.

56. These techniques are discussed by Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
57. *JI* as cited by AFP, 21 August — DR, 21 August 1987.
58. R. Tehran, SPA, 26 August — DR, 27 August 1987.
59. *FR*, May; statement by Kuwait Hizballah also carried by *al-'Ahd*, 27 March 1987.
60. *Kayhan*, 27 July 1986.
61. Speech by Shaykh 'Ali Yasin, *al-'Ahd*, 28 February 1986.
62. The account in *CSM*, 5 August 1987, is also well informed.
63. Lecture by Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, *al-'Ahd*, 24 April 1987.
64. Details of Hizballah's reception of Dastmalchiyan, *al-'Ahd*, 13 March 1987.
65. Text of statement, *al-Shira'*, 16 June 1987.
66. Interview with Fadlallah, *Monday Morning*, 15–21 October 1984.
67. *Al-Qabas*, 3 November; *FR*, 12 November 1987.
68. The internal debate in Hizballah over hostage-taking is considered in greater detail by Martin Kramer, "La morale du Hizbollah et sa logique," *Maghreb-Machrek*, No. 119, March-April-May 1988, pp. 39–59.
69. Ibrahim al-Amin's speech, quoted by UPI, 30 June 1987.
70. Interview in *al-'Ahd*, 23 January 1987.
71. A major visit of 150 families of Lebanese Shi'i martyrs took place in April 1987; *al-'Ahd*, 17, 24 April; R. Tehran, 27 April — SWB, 30 April; photograph of members of families at Zaynab mausoleum, *al-'Ahd*, 14 February 1987.
72. To 'Aqil Hamiyya and 'Imad Mughniyya, according to *FR*, 12 November 1987.
73. AFP, 5 July — DR, 7 July 1987.
74. Interview with Husayn al-Musawi, *NAD*, 10–16 June 1985.
75. Speech by Ibrahim al-Amin, *al-'Ahd*, 23 January 1987.
76. Interview with Ghazi Kan'an, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 6 March 1987.
77. AFP, 25 February 1987.
78. Interview with Fadlallah, *Libération*, 13 March 1987.
79. Accounts in *al-Nahar*, 26, 27 February 1987.
80. Statements made in reaction to the killings and photographs of the "martyrs" in *al-'Ahd*, 28 February, 6 March 1987.
81. *Al-'Ahd*, 13 March 1987.
82. Shaykhs Subhi al-Tufayli and Ibrahim al-Amin, Islamic Amal leader Husayn al-Musawi, and Hizballah security official al-Hajj Husayn Khalil. Meeting reported in *al-'Ahd*, 27 March 1987.
83. Interview with Husayn al-Musawi, *al-Majalla*, 8–14 April 1987.
84. Interview with Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, *Middle East Insight*, May-June 1987.
85. *Al-Badil al-Islami*, No. 10, cited by *al-Shira'*, 12 October 1987. *Al-Badil al-Islami* was an Iraqi Shi'i opposition newspaper which began publication in Beirut in 1987. It reflected the attitudes of *al-Da'wa*, free from all Iranian constraints.
86. Interview with the director of the Tripoli office, *al-Surush li'l-'Alam al-'Arabi*, 15 Ramadan—15 Shawwal 1407.
87. *Al-Shira'*, 17 August 1987.
88. Interview with Sha'ban, *al-Wahda al-Islamiyya*, 25 September; *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, November 1987.
89. *Al-Shira'*, 31 August 1987.
90. Text of Sha'ban's letter, *al-Tali'a al-Islamiyya*, 2 November; *al-'Ahd*, 23 October 1987.
91. *Al-'Ahd*, 27 November 1987.
92. Interview with Sha'ban, *al-Wahda al-Islamiyya*, 25 September; *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, November 1987.
93. Details of the report, *al-Anwar*, 18 May — DR, 22 May; *al-Wafd*, 4 June — DR, 9 June 1987.
94. MENA, 13 May — DR, 14 May 1987.
95. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 18 May, 15 July; *al-Safir*, 11 July 1987.
96. *Al-Wafd*, 18 September 1987, citing "responsible security sources."
97. The case is summarized in *JA*, 9 September; other details in *FR*, 2 April 1987.

98. Interview with *al-Majalla*, 28 September 1987.
99. Text in *al-Tali'a al-Islamiyya*, October 1987.
100. *IHT*, 29 September; *Le Monde*, 9 October 1987.
101. *IHT*, 23 June 1987.
102. R. Tunis, 26 May — DR, 28 May; 16 July — SWB, 18 July 1987.
103. For the historical background to this controversy, see Martin Kramer, "Tragedy in Mecca," *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 231–47, and the article by Martin Kramer in *NYT*, 5 August 1987.
104. Text of speech, R. Tehran, 2 July — SWB, 4 July 1987.
105. SPA, 3 July — SWB, 6 July 1987.
106. R. Tehran, 30 July — SWB, 1 August 1987.
107. Text of speech, R. Tehran, 29, 30, 31 July — SWB, 31 July, 1, 3 August; Arabic text of the speech, *al-'Ahd*, 2 August 1987.
108. Report on the assessment of American intelligence sources, *NYT*, 6 September 1987.
109. The most detailed eyewitness account from a pro-Iranian perspective is that of the Pakistani Shi'i journalist Mushahid Hussain, which appeared in *WP*, 20 August 1987. The Saudi director'general of public security, Gen. 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shaykh, provided the most comprehensive Saudi account in a statement which prefaced a special Saudi documentary film on the incident, aired on Saudi TV on 20 August 1987.
110. Na'if press conference, SPA, 25 August — SWB, 27 August 1987.
111. Khomeyni's message to Karrubi, R. Tehran, 3 August — SWB, 5 August 1987.
112. Text of Rafsanjani's speech to protest march in Tehran, R. Tehran, 2 August — SWB, 4 August 1987.
113. Dates and details on previous conferences, *Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami*, 5 October 1987.
114. Text of Fahd's speech, R. Riyadh, 13 October — DR, 15 October 1987.
115. Text of communiqué, SPA, 15 October — DR, 16 October 1987.
116. *Al-'Ahd*, 23 October 1987.
117. *Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, October 1987.
118. Ibid., November 1987.
119. Ibid., October 1987.
120. IRNA, 10 October — DR, 15 October 1987.
121. Details in *al-'Ahd*, 27 November, 4 December 1987.
122. Khameneh'i's remarks, R. Tehran, 23 November — DR, 25 November 1987.
123. Rafsanjani's speech, R. Tehran, 26 November — DR, 28 November 1987.
124. Montazeri's speech, R. Tehran, 27 November — DR, 30 November 1987.
125. Text of resolutions and other details, *al-'Ahd*, 4 December 1987.